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Navigating Challenges in Electricity Markets

This paper discusses the balance of supply and demand in electricity markets.

― 7 min read


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Table of Contents

Electricity markets operate in a way to balance supply and demand. Usually, this is done through a two-stage process: the day-ahead market and the real-time market. The day-ahead market allows participants to set their commitments in advance for the next day, helping to manage risks related to price changes. The real-time market allows adjustments based on actual demand and supply.

However, issues like price manipulation can arise. Some participants might take advantage of discrepancies between the two markets. To tackle this, market operators have introduced strategies to discourage non-competitive behavior. This paper looks into these strategies and their impacts on market dynamics.

Electricity Market Overview

Electricity markets in the U.S. generally follow a two-stage clearing process. The first stage is the day-ahead market, where participants submit their bids to generate or consume power for the next day. The outcomes of this market help to reduce risks related to changes in demand or supply forecasts.

The second stage is the real-time market, which operates throughout the day to react to actual demand and generation. Typically, most of the electricity trading happens in the day-ahead market, as it offers more stability.

Problems such as forecasting errors and unexpected generator outages can lead to significant price differences between the day-ahead and real-time markets. Some participants may exploit these differences, which can lessen overall market efficiency and encourage non-competitive behavior.

Market Power Mitigation

To encourage competition, Independent System Operators (ISOs) implement strategies to limit market power. These strategies include identifying and replacing non-competitive bids to ensure that prices align with competitive standards. However, despite these efforts, instances of non-competitive behavior have been observed in various regions.

The aim of market power mitigation policies is to ensure fair pricing and efficient market operations. By replacing suspicious bids with standard bids, operators aim to create a level playing field among all market participants. However, this approach can lead to unintended consequences, such as reduced market efficiency.

Market Dynamics of Two-Stage Settlements

In the two-stage market, participants can behave in one of two ways: price-taking or price-anticipating. Price-taking participants accept the market prices as given, while price-anticipating participants strategically set their bids based on expected outcomes.

When participants interact in the market, their decisions affect each other. In a standard two-stage market, the competition can yield different outcomes based on how participants decide to bid. In the case of price-taking participants, we observe a Competitive Equilibrium where prices reflect the underlying costs of generation.

Competitive Equilibrium

At competitive equilibrium, every participant acts in their best interest without taking others' actions into account. The market reaches a state where the supply matches the demand, and no participant has the incentive to change their bids. This state is often considered ideal as it aligns with the goals of efficient market operation.

However, attaining competitive equilibrium is challenging due to the complexities and dynamics of market behavior. Different bidding strategies by participants can result in varied outcomes. Thus, understanding how these dynamics work is crucial for improving market efficiency.

Nash Equilibrium

The Nash equilibrium arises in situations where participants adopt strategic participation. Each participant anticipates the actions of others and adjusts their bids accordingly. At Nash equilibrium, the actions of all participants reach a state where no one can benefit from changing their strategy.

While Nash equilibrium can reflect a competitive state, it might not always align with efficient market outcomes. For example, it could lead to higher prices for consumers and profits for producers, which may not be desirable from an overall market perspective.

Market Power Mitigation Policies

Market power mitigation policies are designed to counteract manipulation and ensure fair trade in electricity markets. These policies can be applied at both the real-time and day-ahead market stages. Operators implement these policies with the hope of reducing the opportunity for participants to exploit price differences.

Real-Time Market Power Mitigation

In the real-time market, operators attempt to establish a balance by accurately estimating the costs of generators. By using these estimates, operators can replace suspicious bids with more accurate price representations, thus creating an environment where generators have less opportunity to exercise market power.

Typically, this involves substituting bids that may be artificially high or low with default bids based on estimated operation costs. The goal is to minimize the risk of price manipulation while ensuring that suppliers still receive adequate compensation for their services.

Day-Ahead Market Power Mitigation

The day-ahead market power mitigation works similarly. Here, operators estimate costs to establish fair market prices for the next day’s operations. By ensuring that all bids align with these estimates, operators can create a more efficient market where price fluctuations are minimized.

The day-ahead market is particularly important because it sets the stage for real-time market operations. Thus, any inefficiencies or manipulations in this phase can ripple through to the real-time market, affecting overall market stability.

Modeling Bidding Behavior

Understanding how market participants bid is crucial to developing effective policies. This paper examines two types of bidding methods: intercept function bidding and slope function bidding.

Intercept Function Bidding

With intercept function bidding, generators submit bids that reflect their willingness to generate power at different price points. This method allows for more accurate representations of the actual costs associated with power generation, potentially leading to a more efficient market.

In a market using intercept function bidding, generators can adjust their bids based on their individual operational costs while considering their competitive standing. This flexibility is critical, especially in a market with mitigation policies in place.

Slope Function Bidding

Slope function bidding is a more traditional approach where generators submit bids based on a linear supply function. This method assumes a constant relationship between price and quantity supplied, which may not always reflect real-world scenarios. As a result, it can lead to inefficiencies in the market.

In a slope function bidding environment, the prices might not align with actual operation costs as effectively as in intercept function bidding, potentially leading to greater discrepancies between the day-ahead and real-time market prices.

Analysis of Market Outcomes

The effectiveness of market power mitigation policies can be assessed by comparing market outcomes under different bidding strategies. Competitive equilibrium and Nash equilibrium offer insights into how these strategies affect market dynamics.

Competitive Equilibrium vs. Nash Equilibrium

Comparing these two states can reveal important aspects of market behavior. In competitive equilibrium, all participants benefit from an efficient market where supply meets demand effectively. In contrast, Nash equilibrium may yield higher profits for some producers while leading to unfavorable conditions for consumers.

For operators, the goal is to achieve a balance where both competitive outcomes and fairness are maintained in the market. This balance is crucial for promoting sustainable market practices and ensuring that consumers are not unduly burdened by high prices.

Insights on Mitigation Policies

The paper’s analysis indicates that market power mitigation policies can influence the distribution of market power. These policies can shift market advantages from generators to consumers. However, they also run the risk of creating a scenario where loads might exploit their positions, leading to unfavorable outcomes for generators.

The implications of these findings suggest the need for careful design and implementation of market power mitigation policies. Operators must ensure that the policies enhance competition without creating new avenues for manipulation.

Conclusion

Electricity markets face unique challenges that require thoughtful design and implementation of policies to encourage competition. The two-stage settlement process provides an effective framework for balancing supply and demand, but it also presents opportunities for market manipulation.

By examining different bidding strategies and analyzing their impacts, this paper highlights the importance of developing effective market power mitigation policies. Ultimately, maintaining a fair and efficient market is critical for ensuring that consumers and producers alike can benefit from stable and reasonable prices.

The findings underscore the need for ongoing research and evaluation of market dynamics to adapt to changing conditions and ensure that electricity markets function optimally for all participants.

Original Source

Title: Intercept Function and Quantity Bidding in Two-stage Electricity Market with Market Power Mitigation

Abstract: Electricity markets typically operate in two stages, day-ahead and real-time. Despite best efforts striving efficiency, evidence of price manipulation has called for system-level market power mitigation (MPM) initiatives that substitute noncompetitive bids with default bids. Implementing these policies with a limited understanding of participant behavior may lead to unintended economic losses. In this paper, we model the competition between generators and inelastic loads in a two-stage market with stage-wise MPM policies. The loss of Nash equilibrium and lack of guarantee of stable market outcome in the case of conventional supply function bidding motivates the use of an alternative market mechanism where generators bid an intercept function. A Nash equilibrium analysis for a day-ahead MPM policy leads to a Stackelberg-Nash game with loads exercising market power at the expense of generators. A comparison of the resulting equilibrium with the standard market (not implementing any MPM policy) shows that a day-ahead policy completely mitigates the market power of generators. On the other hand, the real-time MPM policy increases demand allocation to real-time, contrary to current market practice with most electricity trades in the day-ahead market. Numerical studies illustrate the impact of the slope of the intercept function on the standard market.

Authors: Rajni Kant Bansal, Yue Chen, Pengcheng You, Enrique Mallada

Last Update: 2023-08-10 00:00:00

Language: English

Source URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.05570

Source PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2308.05570

Licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Changes: This summary was created with assistance from AI and may have inaccuracies. For accurate information, please refer to the original source documents linked here.

Thank you to arxiv for use of its open access interoperability.

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