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Protecting Time Synchronization from Cyber Threats

New methods enhance time synchronization security against delays from cyber attacks.

― 5 min read


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Table of Contents

Time synchronization is essential for many modern systems, like Smart Grids and 5G networks. These systems often need clocks that are very accurate. Even a tiny mistake in timekeeping can cause big problems, like slowing down operations or even causing failures in the system.

One common method to keep time synchronized across different devices is called the Precision Time Protocol (PTP). This protocol works well when everything is secure and in a trusted environment. However, it can fail when there are cyber threats, especially from attacks that alter the timing of messages. These types of attacks, known as time delay attacks, make it seem like the clocks are synchronized when they are not.

With cyber threats growing, especially against important systems, there is a big need for solutions that can protect time synchronization and the services that rely on them. Yet, the current methods to protect PTP have some shortcomings. They may not work well in bigger systems or may miss important details about timing.

Cyber Attacks Against Time Protocols

Time delay attacks are particularly dangerous because they can change the way clocks are synchronized without anyone noticing. Attackers can delay messages in such a way that the affected systems drift apart in time. For example, in a Smart Grid, these delays can disrupt the control systems, leading to serious issues.

To counter these attacks, we need solutions that can detect when timing is being tampered with. Current methods to protect against such attacks have limitations. They either rely on static settings that can create false alarms or require special devices that may not work everywhere. There is a crucial need for a method that can effectively detect and address timing-related threats without depending too heavily on single points of failure.

Proposed Solutions to Enhance PTP

To improve the reliability of PTP against time delay attacks, we propose a method that uses measurements from multiple paths in the network. By using extra paths, we can compare the timing of messages and check for delays. This approach provides a way to find hidden problems in how time is being shared.

We introduce a new protocol called PTPsec. This protocol builds upon the existing PTP standard but adds stronger ways to detect and deal with time delay attacks. By sending special measurement messages along different routes, we can monitor how time is affected by potential threats.

Importance of Network Redundancy

In our method, having multiple paths in a network is critical. This redundancy allows us to gather more data about how messages travel through the system. If one path is under attack, other paths can provide accurate timing details that can tell us something is wrong.

The process works like this: as messages travel along different paths, we measure the time it takes for each message to arrive at its destination. By comparing these times, we can identify if any message has been delayed. If we notice differences in timing, it alerts us to possible attacks.

Steps for Attack Detection and Mitigation

Measurement Process

  1. Sending Messages: When a device wants to synchronize its time with another, it sends a Sync message. This message is sent along the primary synchronization path.

  2. Measurement Messages: After sending the Sync message, measurement messages are sent along Redundant Paths. These messages help us gather timing information without interfering with the regular PTP messages.

  3. Gathering Data: As the Sync and measurement messages travel, we collect timestamps at each hop along the way. This helps us calculate how long each message takes to travel.

  4. Comparing Results: By comparing the travel times from both the primary and redundant paths, we can assess if there are irregularities in timing. If a delay is detected, it may indicate a time delay attack.

Mitigation Process

Once an attack is detected, the system can take steps to mitigate its impact:

  • Adjusting Clock Settings: The system can compute a corrected clock value based on the delays measured. This adjusted value can then be used to update the local clock, ensuring accurate timekeeping even while under threat.

  • Continuous Monitoring: Our approach also includes continuous monitoring of the network paths. If changes in timing patterns are detected, the system can respond quickly to potential threats.

Testing and Validation

To ensure that our proposed solutions work in real-world scenarios, we performed tests on actual hardware setups. We connected two computers and introduced an attacker that could delay messages on the network. This setup allowed us to simulate various attack scenarios.

Static Delay Attack

In the first experiment, we tested a static delay attack, where the attacker consistently delayed certain messages over a fixed period. Our results showed that while the conventional PTP protocol reported no errors, our PTPsec method detected the increasing offset in clock times. This demonstrated that our approach can identify problems even when traditional methods fail.

Incremental Delay Attack

Next, we applied an incremental delay attack, where the attacker gradually increased message delays. Our measurements showed that both the real clock offsets and the estimated path asymmetries changed in response to these increases. The PTPsec protocol successfully tracked these changes, confirming its reliability in detecting dynamic attacks.

Conclusion and Future Directions

Our work presents a robust solution for protecting PTP against time delay attacks. By enhancing the existing protocol with new methods that utilize network redundancy and measurement analysis, we provide a means to detect and respond to threats quickly.

This approach not only improves the security of time-sensitive applications, but also offers a template for future research and development in the field of Network Security. Further investigations could explore the integration of PTPsec into more extensive systems or adapting it for use in different network environments.

As our reliance on precise timing grows, especially in critical systems, it is essential to develop secure methods to ensure that timing remains accurate and trustworthy. With the rising threats in the digital landscape, our work represents a step towards safeguarding the integrity of time synchronization across various applications.

Original Source

Title: PTPsec: Securing the Precision Time Protocol Against Time Delay Attacks Using Cyclic Path Asymmetry Analysis

Abstract: High-precision time synchronization is a vital prerequisite for many modern applications and technologies, including Smart Grids, Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN), and 5G networks. Although the Precision Time Protocol (PTP) can accomplish this requirement in trusted environments, it becomes unreliable in the presence of specific cyber attacks. Mainly, time delay attacks pose the highest threat to the protocol, enabling attackers to diverge targeted clocks undetected. With the increasing danger of cyber attacks, especially against critical infrastructure, there is a great demand for effective countermeasures to secure both time synchronization and the applications that depend on it. However, current solutions are not sufficiently capable of mitigating sophisticated delay attacks. For example, they lack proper integration into the PTP protocol, scalability, or sound evaluation with the required microsecond-level accuracy. This work proposes an approach to detect and counteract delay attacks against PTP based on cyclic path asymmetry measurements over redundant paths. For that, we provide a method to find redundant paths in arbitrary networks and show how this redundancy can be exploited to reveal and mitigate undesirable asymmetries on the synchronization path that cause the malicious clock divergence. Furthermore, we propose PTPsec, a secure PTP protocol and its implementation based on the latest IEEE 1588-2019 standard. With PTPsec, we advance the conventional PTP to support reliable delay attack detection and mitigation. We validate our approach on a hardware testbed, which includes an attacker capable of performing static and incremental delay attacks at a microsecond precision. Our experimental results show that all attack scenarios can be reliably detected and mitigated with minimal detection time.

Authors: Andreas Finkenzeller, Oliver Butowski, Emanuel Regnath, Mohammad Hamad, Sebastian Steinhorst

Last Update: 2024-02-07 00:00:00

Language: English

Source URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.10664

Source PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.10664

Licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Changes: This summary was created with assistance from AI and may have inaccuracies. For accurate information, please refer to the original source documents linked here.

Thank you to arxiv for use of its open access interoperability.

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