Pricing Strategies in Supply Chain Games
Examining Stackelberg games and pricing strategies in supply chains.
― 6 min read
Table of Contents
In this article, we discuss a concept called the Stackelberg Game related to pricing in a supply chain. A Stackelberg game involves two players or agents who act in a specific order. The first player, known as the leader, makes a decision first, while the second player, called the follower, responds based on the leader's choice. Our focus is on a situation where the first player is a supplier, and the second player is a retailer.
In this pricing game, the supplier tries to set a wholesale price for a product without fully knowing how much demand there will be for that product. After the supplier sets the price, the retailer must decide how much of the product to order and at what resale price to sell it to customers. This setup resembles a well-known business scenario called the Newsvendor Problem, where a retailer has to decide how much stock to order before knowing the actual demand.
Challenges in Pricing
A central issue in this game is uncertainty in demand. The supplier does not have clear information about how much product will be sold. This uncertainty presents challenges in determining the best price for the product and the optimal amount to stock. Both players in the game must find a way to maximize their profits while dealing with this uncertainty.
The retailer, acting as the follower, will always respond to the supplier's decisions. If the supplier sets a high price, the retailer might choose to stock less of the product. Conversely, a lower price may lead the retailer to order more. This interaction creates a dynamic where both agents must learn from each other's actions over time.
Learning from Experience
To make decisions in this game, both players need to learn about demand and supply conditions. The supplier, as the leader, must learn how the retailer will respond to different pricing strategies. The retailer, in turn, must understand how to react optimally to the supplier's price setting.
A way to enable this learning is through Algorithms that help each player adjust their strategies based on past experiences. These algorithms help them minimize Regret, which is the difference between the profits they could have made if they had perfectly known the future demands versus their actual profits.
The Role of Algorithms
In the context of our game, we employ algorithms that allow players to learn and adapt their strategies over time. These are useful tools that help both players figure out how to price their products better through trial and error. Some algorithms focus on predicting the best response of the follower based on the leader's actions. Others help the leader estimate the optimal product price through continuous learning.
For example, one approach involves using contextual information, which could be past sales data or trends, to make more informed decisions. By applying these algorithms, the supplier can make educated guesses about what price might result in higher demand, while the retailer can decide how much stock to order accordingly.
The Concept of Regret
Regret in this context refers to the profit that each player misses out on due to not having the right strategies. Both players want to minimize their regret. For the supplier, this means setting a price that maximizes revenue while ensuring that the retailer can sell the product profitably. For the retailer, it involves choosing the right amount of product to order and selling at an optimal price.
It's essential for both players to continuously learn and adjust their strategies to reduce regret over time. Learning algorithms play a crucial role in helping them achieve this goal.
The Newsvendor Model
The Newsvendor model is a standard framework used to analyze situations where a retailer must decide how much stock to order before knowing the actual demand. The retailer faces the risk of either ordering too much, leading to excess inventory costs, or ordering too little, resulting in missed sales opportunities.
In our Stackelberg game, the retailer is not just deciding how much to order but is also setting a selling price. This adds another layer of complexity, as both decisions are interdependent-the order quantity affects the price, and vice versa.
Dynamic Pricing Strategy
Dynamic pricing refers to adjusting prices based on real-time market conditions. In our scenario, the supplier can dynamically adjust wholesale prices based on what they learn about demand from the retailer's orders. The retailer, facing different pricing strategies, must also adjust their resale price to maximize profit while ensuring adequate stock.
In practice, retailers often consider various factors, such as competitor prices and consumer behavior, to set their prices. The supplier can similarly adjust wholesale prices based on retailer behavior, creating a feedback loop where both players influence each other's outcomes.
The Learning Process
As both players act over time, they learn from their experiences. The supplier observes how changes in pricing affect the retailer's order quantities. The retailer, in turn, analyzes how their pricing strategies impact overall sales and inventory levels.
This learning process is iterative. Over multiple rounds of the game, both players refine their strategies. They gather data on demand and pricing, allowing them to make increasingly informed decisions.
Empirical Testing
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed learning algorithms, experiments can be conducted to simulate the pricing game. By testing how different strategies perform in various scenarios, we can identify which approaches lead to lower regret and higher profits for both players.
Empirical results may show that algorithms that allow for adaptive learning yield better outcomes than static strategies. For example, if a supplier uses a flexible pricing algorithm, they may achieve better results than a supplier who sets fixed wholesale prices.
Conclusion
In summary, the dynamic pricing game between a supplier and retailer exemplifies the complexities of pricing strategies under uncertainty. The Stackelberg game model highlights the importance of sequential decision-making and the need for both players to learn from their interactions to minimize regret.
Through the use of sophisticated algorithms, both players can navigate the uncertainties of demand and supply to optimize their decision-making processes. Continuous learning is at the heart of ensuring that both the supplier and retailer can adapt their strategies effectively in a competitive market.
Incorporating dynamic pricing strategies into their games opens up myriad possibilities for improved profitability, enabling both the supplier and retailer to thrive in uncertain market conditions. Our exploration shows that this framework not only applies in theory but also has practical implications for real-world business scenarios.
As we look ahead, further research can be conducted to explore additional nuances in the pricing game and the application of modern machine learning techniques to enhance decision-making among competing agents in a supply chain. By leveraging data and advanced algorithms, we aim to shape a future where pricing strategies are not only informed but optimized for success.
Title: No-Regret Learning for Stackelberg Equilibrium Computation in Newsvendor Pricing Games
Abstract: We introduce the application of online learning in a Stackelberg game pertaining to a system with two learning agents in a dyadic exchange network, consisting of a supplier and retailer, specifically where the parameters of the demand function are unknown. In this game, the supplier is the first-moving leader, and must determine the optimal wholesale price of the product. Subsequently, the retailer who is the follower, must determine both the optimal procurement amount and selling price of the product. In the perfect information setting, this is known as the classical price-setting Newsvendor problem, and we prove the existence of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium when extending this to a two-player pricing game. In the framework of online learning, the parameters of the reward function for both the follower and leader must be learned, under the assumption that the follower will best respond with optimism under uncertainty. A novel algorithm based on contextual linear bandits with a measurable uncertainty set is used to provide a confidence bound on the parameters of the stochastic demand. Consequently, optimal finite time regret bounds on the Stackelberg regret, along with convergence guarantees to an approximate Stackelberg equilibrium, are provided.
Authors: Larkin Liu, Yuming Rong
Last Update: 2024-10-11 00:00:00
Language: English
Source URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.00203
Source PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.00203
Licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Changes: This summary was created with assistance from AI and may have inaccuracies. For accurate information, please refer to the original source documents linked here.
Thank you to arxiv for use of its open access interoperability.
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