Vulnerabilities in Deep Neural Network Executables
Examining security risks of DNN executables against bit-flip attacks.
― 5 min read
Table of Contents
- What are Bit-flip Attacks?
- The Importance of DNN Executables
- Existing Research and Its Gaps
- The Attack Approach
- Findings on DNN Executables Vulnerability
- Attack Strategies
- Observations from the Study
- Examples of Attacks and Their Effects
- Attack Efficiency
- Recommendations for Future DNN Security
- Conclusion
- Original Source
Recently, the use of deep neural networks (DNNs) in various applications has grown significantly. DNNs are being used in many places, from cloud computing to mobile devices. As these networks are applied more widely, there is an increasing concern about their security, especially regarding the potential for attacks. One such attack is the bit-flip attack, which can compromise the effectiveness of DNNs by changing their output.
Bit-flip Attacks?
What areBit-flip attacks take advantage of certain weaknesses in computer memory, particularly in a type called DRAM. These attacks can change specific bits in the memory, resulting in incorrect outputs from DNN models. The RowHammer technique is one method used to perform bit-flip attacks. It involves accessing rows of memory rapidly to cause changes in nearby rows, flipping bits without needing direct access to them.
The Importance of DNN Executables
DNNs are often converted into low-level executable files for faster execution on hardware. These executables are designed to run directly on computer processors, making them more efficient than when they are run through high-level programming frameworks. However, as they are more efficient, they may also present a different security risk. This paper explores how bit-flip attacks can target these DNN executables.
Existing Research and Its Gaps
Most existing research on bit-flip attacks has focused on high-level frameworks like PyTorch. While effective in those contexts, there remains a significant gap when it comes to understanding the vulnerability of DNN executables. This study aims to fill that gap by investigating how bit-flip attacks can be executed on DNN executables specifically.
The Attack Approach
To investigate the vulnerabilities in DNN executables, the research employs an automated tool that identifies weak points where attacks can be launched. Instead of relying on assumptions about how the model weights are organized or stored, this study focuses only on the model structure. This approach allows attackers to exploit vulnerabilities with minimal knowledge of the DNN's internal workings.
Findings on DNN Executables Vulnerability
DNN executables have been found to have extensive and severe vulnerabilities to bit-flip attacks. Many of these vulnerable bits do not exist in high-level DNN models, indicating a unique aspect of low-level executables. These vulnerabilities can drastically affect the intelligence of the model, leading to erroneous outcomes.
The Vulnerability Landscape
On average, many executables contain thousands of bits that can be flipped without prior knowledge of the exact model weights. This indicates a pervasive risk across various DNNs when compiled into executable form. The research identifies a process to locate vulnerable bits systematically.
Attack Strategies
The researchers propose several strategies for effectively executing bit-flip attacks on DNN executables. One such strategy involves using a "vulnerable bit searcher," which methodically scans for bits that can be flipped to manipulate the model’s output.
Offline and Online Attack Phases
The attack consists of two main phases:
Offline Phase: In this phase, the attacker collects DNN executables with shared structures to identify vulnerable bits. This helps create a set of bits that are likely to be transferable between different executables.
Online Phase: During this stage, attackers implement the identified bits through Rowhammer techniques in a real-world environment, confirming their effectiveness in manipulating the victim’s outputs.
Observations from the Study
The research yields several important observations:
Pervasiveness of Vulnerabilities: A considerable number of vulnerable bits are present across various DNN executables. This presents a rich attack surface for potential exploitation.
Effectiveness of Attacks: A significant percentage of attacks succeed with as little as one bit flip, demonstrating the practical nature of these exploits.
Versatility of Attacks: These attacks can aim for different outcomes, whether impacting classification accuracy or altering outputs of generative models.
Transferability of Vulnerable Bits: Many vulnerable bits can be utilized across different executables that share the same structure, making it easier for attackers to adapt and launch attacks.
Examples of Attacks and Their Effects
Classification Models
In the case of classification models, flipping a vulnerable bit can lead the model to produce random outputs or guesses, significantly dropping its accuracy. For example, a model that originally has an accuracy of 90% can be reduced to just 10% accuracy through simple manipulation.
Generative Models
For generative models, the effects are equally troubling. With a single bit flip, attackers can alter the nature of generated outputs, making them produce biased or harmful images. This raises concerns in scenarios where generative models might be used in critical applications like medical imaging.
Attack Efficiency
The study assesses the efficiency of the attacks, concluding that most attacks can be executed with very few bit flips. On average, only one or two flips lead to substantial manipulation of the DNN outputs. This simplicity adds to the concern surrounding the security of DNN executables.
Recommendations for Future DNN Security
Given the findings, there is an urgent need to incorporate security measures into DNN compilation processes. This could involve designing specific defenses against bit-flip vulnerabilities, such as code obfuscation and data integrity checks to ensure that the executables maintain their intended functionality.
Conclusion
The research highlights a critical area of vulnerability within DNN executables that has largely been overlooked in past studies. By systematically examining how bit-flip attacks can exploit these executables, it lays the groundwork for further investigation into practical security measures that can be implemented to protect DNNs in real-world applications. Future studies should focus on developing robust defenses that can mitigate the risks associated with the identified vulnerabilities in DNN executables.
Title: Compiled Models, Built-In Exploits: Uncovering Pervasive Bit-Flip Attack Surfaces in DNN Executables
Abstract: Bit-flip attacks (BFAs) can manipulate deep neural networks (DNNs). For high-level DNN models running on deep learning (DL) frameworks like PyTorch, extensive BFAs have been used to flip bits in model weights and shown effective. Defenses have also been proposed to guard model weights. However, DNNs are increasingly compiled into DNN executables by DL compilers to leverage hardware primitives. These executables manifest distinct computation paradigms; existing research fails to accurately capture and expose the BFA surfaces on DNN executables. To this end, we launch the first systematic study of BFAs on DNN executables. Prior BFAs are limited to attacking model weights and assume a strong whitebox attacker with full knowledge of victim model weights, which is unrealistic as weights are often confidential. In contrast, we find that BFAs on DNN executables can achieve high effectiveness by exploiting the model structure (usually stored in the executable code), which only requires knowing the (often public) model structure. Importantly, such structure-based BFAs are pervasive, transferable, and more severe in DNN executables. They also slip past existing defenses. To demonstrate the new attack surfaces, we assume a weak and more realistic attacker with no knowledge of victim model weights. We design an automated tool to identify vulnerable bits in victim executables with high confidence (70% vs. baseline 2%). We show on DDR4 DRAM that only 1.4 flips on average are needed to fully downgrade the accuracy of victim models, including quantized ones which could require 23x more flips previously, to random guesses. We comprehensively evaluate 16 DNN executables, covering large-scale models trained on commonly-used datasets compiled by the two most popular DL compilers. Our finding calls for incorporating security mechanisms in future DNN compilation toolchains.
Authors: Yanzuo Chen, Zhibo Liu, Yuanyuan Yuan, Sihang Hu, Tianxiang Li, Shuai Wang
Last Update: 2024-10-21 00:00:00
Language: English
Source URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.06223
Source PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.06223
Licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Changes: This summary was created with assistance from AI and may have inaccuracies. For accurate information, please refer to the original source documents linked here.
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