Fair Division of Indivisible Chores: A New Approach
This paper presents methods for equitably dividing chores among individuals.
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Table of Contents
Dividing tasks that cannot be split fairly among people presents a big challenge. This issue often arises in daily life. For example, when friends share housework or when siblings divide responsibilities in a family, making sure everyone feels satisfied with what they have can be difficult. In this paper, we look into methods to ensure that chores are divided fairly among people while also considering how well those divisions work.
Fairness Concepts
In discussions about fairness, two main concepts come up: Envy-freeness and Pareto Optimality. Envy-freeness means that no person should feel that someone else is better off after the division of tasks. Pareto optimality means that we cannot make one person better off without making another worse off. Our work tries to balance these two concepts when chores are assigned.
The Problems We Address
When dealing with chores that cannot be divided into smaller tasks, we need to figure out how to make people feel that the division is fair. The most common type of fairness we look at is envy-freeness up to one task. This means that even if someone is given a chore they do not want, they should still feel okay about it in comparison to other tasks.
However, finding such arrangements is difficult. We know that when chores are indivisible, achieving perfect envy-freeness is often impossible. We explore ways to achieve approximate solutions instead.
Approaching Fair Division
To address the fairness and efficiency of chore division, we introduce a new model of earning-restricted competitive equilibrium. In this model, each person has a limit to how much they can earn from chores. This restriction helps guide the division process in a way that promotes fairness.
We use mathematical methods to solve for these equitable divisions. Central to our approach is ensuring that the resulting allocations remain fair while giving everyone a reasonable workload.
Key Results
Our studies demonstrate that it is indeed possible to create allocations that meet our fairness and efficiency standards. Specifically, we find that in any situation involving chores, we can achieve at least a fair division.
- For all cases, there exists a division that achieves envy-freeness.
- Bivalued instances, which consist of chores with two distinct costs, can lead to better fairness and efficiency.
- Algorithms have been developed to efficiently compute these Fair Divisions, ensuring that everyone ends up with a reasonable load.
Importance of Fair Division
The ability to divide chores equitably is not just about fairness; it also improves relationships. When people feel that tasks are divided fairly, they are more likely to cooperate and work together in the future. This is crucial in various settings, from families to collaborative workspaces.
Fair Allocation Algorithms
To achieve these fair allocations, we design algorithms that start from a basic division and refine it. The core idea is to progressively adjust the chore assignments until we reach a state where no one feels wronged by the outcome. The algorithms are efficient and can handle even complex scenarios.
Balancing Workloads
The algorithms we propose not only aim for fairness but also work to balance how many chores each person gets. In doing so, we ensure that no one is overwhelmed with too many tasks, which is key to maintaining peace among individuals sharing responsibility.
Earning-Restricted Equilibrium
This new model helps to restrict how much individuals can earn from any given chore. By doing this, it ensures that the divisions become fairer and more appealing to everyone involved. Each person's earning potential is limited, so they must choose chores wisely.
Conclusion
In summary, fair division of indivisible chores using earning-restricted competitive equilibrium is a viable solution to a common problem. With the algorithms we've developed, it is possible to ensure that everyone feels satisfied with their assigned tasks, ultimately leading to more harmonious relations.
Future Work
As we look to the future, there is still much to explore. We can further investigate the balance of fairness and efficiency, applying these concepts to more complex scenarios. The framework we've established offers a solid basis for deeper research, possibly expanding into applications in various sectors beyond household chores.
Acknowledgments
This work has been supported by various grants. We are thankful for the opportunity to explore this important area of research, aiming for fair and peaceful coexistence among individuals sharing responsibilities.
References
Relevant studies and previous works in the fair division of tasks highlight the importance of ongoing research in this field. Continued efforts will drive more effective methods and practices in the future.
Title: Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores
Abstract: We study the problem of fair allocation of chores to agents with additive preferences. In the discrete setting, envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX) has emerged as a compelling fairness criterion. However, establishing its (non-)existence or achieving a meaningful approximation remains a major open question. The current best guarantee is the existence of $O(n^2)$-EFX allocations for $n$ agents, obtained through a sophisticated algorithm (Zhou and Wu, 2022). In this paper, we show the existence of $4$-EFX allocations, providing the first constant-factor approximation of EFX. We also investigate the existence of allocations that are both fair and efficient, using Pareto optimality (PO) as our efficiency criterion. For the special case of bivalued instances, we establish the existence of allocations that are both $3$-EFX and PO, thus improving the current best factor of $O(n)$-EFX without any efficiency guarantees. For general additive instances, the existence of allocations that are $\alpha$-EF$k$ and PO has remained open for any constant values of $\alpha$ and $k$, where EF$k$ denotes envy-freeness up to $k$ chores. We provide the first positive result in this direction by showing the existence of allocations that are $2$-EF$2$ and PO. Our results are obtained via a novel economic framework called earning restricted (ER) competitive equilibrium for fractional allocations, which limits agents' earnings from each chore. We show the existence of ER equilibria by formulating it as an linear complementarity problem (LCP) and proving that the classic complementary pivot algorithm on the LCP terminates at an ER equilibrium. We design algorithms that carefully round fractional ER equilibria, and perform bundle swaps and merges to meet the desired fairness and efficiency criteria. We expect that the concept of ER equilibrium will be useful in deriving further results on related problems.
Authors: Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin
Last Update: 2024-11-21 00:00:00
Language: English
Source URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.03318
Source PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.03318
Licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Changes: This summary was created with assistance from AI and may have inaccuracies. For accurate information, please refer to the original source documents linked here.
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