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FIDO2: Strengthening Online Security Without Passwords

Discover how FIDO2 improves online authentication and addresses security issues.

Marco Casagrande, Daniele Antonioli

― 6 min read


FIDO2 Security Challenges FIDO2 Security Challenges Exposed proposed security enhancements. Uncover vulnerabilities in FIDO2 and
Table of Contents

FIDO2 is a modern standard used for online authentication. It helps users log in without using traditional passwords, which is great because we all know how hard it can be to remember those tricky combinations of letters, numbers, and special symbols. Instead, FIDO2 uses cryptography – fancy talk for math that makes things secure.

FIDO2 includes two main components: WebAuthn, which helps web browsers talk to servers, and CTAP (Client to Authenticator Protocol), which allows devices like USB keys or mobile phones to act as Authenticators. Picture a USB key as your bouncer for the online club – it keeps bad guys out while letting you in.

How FIDO2 Works

In the FIDO2 world, there are four main players: the user, the authenticator, the client (like a web browser), and the relying party (like a website or service).

  1. User: The person trying to log in.
  2. Authenticator: A device that provides secure access, like a security key.
  3. Client: The interface (like a browser) the user interacts with.
  4. Relying Party: The online service that verifies user credentials.

When you want to log into a service, you connect your authenticator to the client. The client sends a request to the relying party, which verifies your identity. If everything checks out, you’re in! No password needed.

The Problem with Security

While FIDO2 sounds fantastic, it’s not without its problems. Over time, security experts have found some vulnerabilities that could allow attackers to bypass the system. These vulnerabilities can be used in various attacks, and here are two types that have been identified:

1. Client Impersonation Attacks (CI)

Imagine someone sneaking into a concert by pretending to be the official ticket checker. That's kind of what happens with client impersonation attacks.

In these attacks, attackers can trick an authenticator into thinking they are the legitimate client. They can reset the authenticator and even delete vital credentials without the user having any clue. This might sound like something out of a spy movie, but it is happening in real life.

2. API Confusion Attacks (AC)

Now, let’s talk about API confusion attacks. This is like getting a waiter who messes up your order but, instead of a cheeseburger, they bring you a salad that you didn't order at all. In the tech world, this means that attackers can trick users into thinking they are calling a secure API, but instead, they are accessing a harmful one.

These attackers can also use the same method to leak user information or even delete credentials while the user believes they are simply taking care of their usual business.

How Attacks Work and Their Consequences

The two types of attacks mentioned above can be executed in various ways. Most notably, they can be done remotely or in close proximity. Here’s a quick overview of how they operate:

Close-Proximity Attacks

In close-proximity attacks, an attacker needs to be near the user. Think of it like a pickpocket trying to grab your wallet in a crowded room. Using tools like NFC readers, attackers can manipulate the connection between the user’s device and the authenticator.

They can issue commands that the user isn't aware of, resulting in credential deletions or unauthorized access.

Remote Attacks

Remote attacks are like being able to pickpocket someone from across the street. These don’t require the attacker to be physically near the user. Instead, they can control a malicious app or device that connects to the authenticator over the internet or Bluetooth.

In both scenarios, the key issue is that the attacks can operate without needing any user interaction or knowledge, which makes them particularly sneaky and dangerous.

The Security Vulnerabilities Behind Attacks

Behind these attacks are several vulnerabilities in the FIDO2 design. Here are some key weaknesses identified:

  1. Lack of Client Authentication: The client doesn’t need to prove who it is to the authenticator. This means anyone can connect.

  2. No Visual Feedback: Users don’t get any visual confirmation when an API call is made. This makes it hard for them to know if something fishy is happening.

  3. User Presence Bypass: When devices communicate over NFC, it can sometimes bypass security checks meant to ensure the user is present. This is like letting someone into a club because they waved at the bouncer from a distance.

  4. Weak Credential Policies: Some Relying Parties allow for weaker credential protections, making it easier for attackers to exploit systems.

Attacks Have Real-Life Consequences

The implications of these vulnerabilities are serious. Attackers can delete valuable credentials, track users, or make authenticators unresponsive. This can prevent users from accessing their accounts or services, causing frustration and loss of access.

For example, if an attacker manages to reset an authenticator, the user could lose access to all their FIDO2 credentials and be locked out of several accounts. Additionally, tracking users can lead to privacy breaches where sensitive information about their online behavior gets exposed.

What Can Be Done to Fix It

Fortunately, fixes can be put in place to address these vulnerabilities. Here are some proposed solutions:

  1. Client Authentication: Require clients to prove their identity before they can communicate with authenticators.

  2. Visual Feedback: Authenticators should indicate when an API call is made, letting users know what is happening.

  3. Stricter Authorization Checks: More robust checks should be enforced for critical operations like credential deletion or factory resets.

  4. Dynamic Credential Policies: Implement policies that frequently change user identifiers and credentials to mitigate tracking through discoverable credentials.

  5. Rate Limiting: Limit the number of times certain API calls can be made in a short time to prevent denial-of-service attacks.

Real-World Implications of Implementing Fixes

Introducing these fixes may come with some challenges. Users may need to adjust to additional steps in the authentication process, which could feel burdensome at times.

However, the trade-off is worth it for increased security. By tightening up the system, users can enjoy safer online experiences without worrying about unauthorized access or credential theft.

Conclusion: The Future of FIDO2 Security

The evolution of FIDO2 and its continuous improvements highlight the tech community's dedication to secure online experiences. While vulnerabilities exist, the proactive approach to identifying and fixing these issues is crucial.

By emphasizing security measures, we can work towards a future where online authentication is not only passwordless but also secure and reliable. After all, nobody wants to become the next unsuspecting victim of digital pickpocketing!

As technology continues to advance, staying ahead of potential risks will ensure that users can enjoy the benefits of online services without falling prey to security threats.

Original Source

Title: CTRAPS: CTAP Client Impersonation and API Confusion on FIDO2

Abstract: FIDO2 is the standard technology for single-factor and second-factor authentication. It is specified in an open standard, including the WebAuthn and CTAP application layer protocols. We focus on CTAP, which allows FIDO2 clients and hardware authenticators to communicate. No prior work has explored the CTAP Authenticator API, a critical protocol-level attack surface. We address this gap by presenting the first security and privacy evaluation of the CTAP Authenticator API. We uncover two classes of protocol-level attacks on CTAP that we call CTRAPS. The client impersonation (CI) attacks exploit the lack of client authentication to tamper with FIDO2 authenticators. They include zero-click attacks capable of deleting FIDO2 credentials, including passkeys, without user interaction. The API confusion (AC) attacks abuse the lack of protocol API enforcements and confound FIDO2 authenticators, clients, and unaware users into calling unwanted CTAP APIs while thinking they are calling legitimate ones. The presented eleven attacks are conducted either in proximity or remotely and are effective regardless of the underlying CTAP transport. We detail the eight vulnerabilities in the CTAP specification, enabling the CTRAPS attacks. Six are novel and include unauthenticated CTAP clients and trackable FIDO2 credentials. We release CTRAPS, an original toolkit, to analyze CTAP and conduct the CTRAPS attacks. We confirm the attacks practicality on a large scale by exploiting six popular authenticators, including a FIPS-certified one from Yubico, Feitian, SoloKeys, and Google, and ten widely used relying parties, such as Microsoft, Apple, GitHub, and Facebook. We present eight practical and backward-compliant countermeasures to fix the attacks and their root causes. We responsibly disclosed our findings to the FIDO alliance and the affected vendors.

Authors: Marco Casagrande, Daniele Antonioli

Last Update: 2024-12-03 00:00:00

Language: English

Source URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.02349

Source PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.02349

Licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Changes: This summary was created with assistance from AI and may have inaccuracies. For accurate information, please refer to the original source documents linked here.

Thank you to arxiv for use of its open access interoperability.

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