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The Art of Decision-Making in Groups

Explore how game theory shapes cooperative decision-making in everyday life.

Arne Gevaert, Yvan Saeys

― 9 min read


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Table of Contents

Game theory is a fascinating area of study that looks at how people make decisions in situations where their choices affect others. It’s like trying to figure out the best strategy in a game, but this game includes real-life scenarios like business deals, political negotiations, or even just deciding where to eat with friends.

Cooperative Games Explained

In the world of game theory, there are different types of games. One important type is called cooperative games. These are games where players can form groups, or “coalitions,” to work together for a common goal. In cooperative games, the main focus is on the shared benefits and how to divide these benefits among the players involved.

Imagine a group of friends trying to pool their money to buy a pizza. They need to decide not only how much each person contributes but also how to split the delicious pizza once it arrives.

Worth of Coalitions

In cooperative games, every group of players has a specific value or “worth” based on what they can achieve together. This worth can change depending on who is in the group. For example, if our pizza-loving friends include a master chef, the worth of their coalition (the pizza party) increases dramatically.

The worth assigned to each group of players helps in understanding how to distribute the total value among them.

The Characteristic Function

To represent these worths mathematically, we use something called a characteristic function. This function tells us the value of every possible coalition. The characteristic function is a key tool in cooperative game theory, allowing players to understand their potential gains when working together.

Transferable Utility (TU) Games

Some cooperative games are known as TU-games, where the value gained can be freely shared among players. In our pizza example, whether one person pays more or less doesn’t matter as long as everyone enjoys their slice. TU-games will be our main focus, as they make it easier to analyze how to share the spoils among players.

Assigning Values to Players

A big question in cooperative games is deciding how much each player should receive from the total worth. This is often done using a “value,” which is a way to measure each player's contribution to the group’s success. One simple method is to calculate the average worth of all coalitions a player is part of.

Imagine we have a player who always seems to enjoy the pizza but never contributes. If we used the average method, they might still get a big piece of the pizza, which wouldn’t feel fair to those who actually helped pay for it.

The Importance of Fairness

This situation brings us to the important concept of fairness in cooperative games. We want to ensure that players who contribute more should receive a larger share of the rewards. To do this, we establish some rules, called axioms, that any method for assigning values should follow. A couple of these rules include:

  • Efficiency: The total value assigned to all players should equal the total worth of the coalition.
  • Dummy: Players who do not contribute to any coalition should receive nothing.

These axioms help guide how values are assigned, ensuring fairness and preventing players from feeling cheated.

The Set of Games and Their Structure

The collection of all possible cooperative games involving a finite number of players forms a mathematical structure called a vector space. This allows us to add games together and analyze them using the same principles we apply to vectors in geometry.

This mathematical approach helps simplify complex interactions among players, shedding light on how coalitions can form and compete.

Permutations and Their Impact

When analyzing games, we can shuffle the players around in many different ways, changing how we look at their contributions. Imagine swapping the names of the pizza lovers; the essence of their contributions remains the same, but the perspective changes. This concept is known as a permutation.

In terms of cooperative games, permuting players helps us see if the established rules (axioms) still hold true or if they change based on the arrangement of players.

Dummy and Null Coalitions

Within our game, we might find certain coalitions that behave in predictable ways. A "dummy coalition" is one that doesn’t change the overall worth of any larger coalition it’s part of. Similarly, a “null player” is one whose presence doesn’t add any value when they join a coalition. These concepts help identify players and groups who contribute little or nothing to the game.

Partnerships in Games

Another interesting concept is the idea of partnerships. A partnership is when a group works together so closely that their combined worth doesn’t change even if some members are missing. Think of it like a band where each musician has a unique role, but if a few leave, the music still sounds the same. This can help explain how certain coalitions function without fully relying on every member's contribution.

Simple Games and Voting

Simple games are a special category of cooperative games where the worth is either a win or a loss for a coalition, like passing a bill in a vote. In these games, we often want to know how much power an individual player holds in swaying the outcome.

Imagine voting to decide where to order for dinner. Each friend wants their voice heard, but some have more influence based on how many friends they can sway to join their choice. This influence can be measured using power indices, which gauge how much weight each player’s vote carries in making a decision.

Unanimity Games

A unique type of simple game is the unanimity game, where a coalition can only win if everyone agrees. This kind of game is essential in understanding voting systems and group dynamics.

In unanimity games, everyone must be on board for a coalition to achieve success, making it a strict but fair method for decision-making among players.

The Value Problem

One of the central challenges in cooperative game theory is figuring out the right way to assign values to players. Fairness is key, and we want to ensure that players are rewarded appropriately based on their contributions.

To tackle this, we need to define several axioms that the value assignment must adhere to. By using these rules, we can create a framework for ensuring that all players feel satisfied with their portion of the pie (or pizza, in our case).

Axioms for Values

Let’s go over some of the most important properties that our values should follow:

  1. Linearity: If two games are combined, then the value should also combine simply.
  2. Null: Players who don’t contribute at all get nothing.
  3. Dummy: Players whose worth remains constant don’t get more just because they join a coalition.
  4. Monotonicity: If a player's value increases, their assigned value should reflect that.
  5. Efficiency: The total values given to players should match the coalition's total worth.

These axioms help ensure that the values assigned to players are fair, logical, and consistent with the nature of cooperation.

Taxonomy of Values

Now that we understand these axioms, we can categorize different methods of assigning values based on which axioms they satisfy. By organizing these methods, we can better understand the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches.

For instance, some methods might follow the linearity axiom, while others follow several axioms simultaneously, resulting in different value systems that aim for fairness.

Marginal Contributions and Probabilistic Values

In assessing a player’s contribution to a coalition, we often look at their marginal contribution. This refers to how much a player adds to a coalition’s worth when they join.

Probabilistic values take this a step further by treating these contributions as averages over many scenarios, allowing us to predict how a player will behave when working with different groups.

The Shapley Value

One of the most famous solutions in cooperative game theory is the Shapley value. This value provides a fair way to divide the total worth of a coalition among its members by averaging the contributions of each player across all possible orderings of arrival to the coalition.

Think of the Shapley value as giving each player their fair share of the pizza based on how they helped create it, factoring in all the ways they could have contributed.

Interaction Indices

While assigning values to individual players is essential, we also need to consider how players interact with one another. Interaction indices help quantify how the presence of one player enhances or diminishes the contributions of others.

So, when two players come together, their combined efforts might yield more or less than the sum of their individual efforts. Understanding these interactions provides a fuller picture of how coalitions work.

The Importance of Discrete Derivatives

The discrete derivative offers a way to assess how a player's contributions change based on who else is around. It helps us see how the dynamics between players evolve depending on the coalition they are part of.

In more straightforward terms, it’s like seeing how adding an extra player to your pizza party changes the overall vibe (and maybe even the amount of pizza eaten)!

Generalized Axioms for Interaction Indices

Just as we created basic axioms for values, we can adapt these rules to interaction indices. This allows us to analyze how different groups of players interact and how these interactions affect their overall worth.

By examining these new axioms, we can classify interaction indices in a similar way to how we examined values, helping us understand the different dynamics at play.

Recursive Axioms and Consistency

To ensure uniqueness in defining interaction indices, researchers proposed recursive axioms, which help clarify how interactions within pairs and groups should behave consistently. These rules define how coalition members relate to one another and allow us to categorize their contributions effectively.

In simpler terms, this means ensuring that a coalition behaves in a predictable way when players start leaving or joining, much like how a well-rehearsed band knows what to do when a musician has a solo.

Conclusion

Game theory offers a treasure trove of insights into how people interact in cooperative scenarios. By using principles like cooperative games, TU-games, and various axioms, we can decode the complex dynamics at play in group decision-making.

Whether you're strategizing over pizza with friends or negotiating a business deal, understanding these concepts can help you navigate the murky waters of cooperation with a clearer perspective. Just remember: fairness and understanding each player’s contribution are the keys to ensuring everyone walks away happy (and well-fed) in any coalition!

Original Source

Title: Unifying Attribution-Based Explanations Using Functional Decomposition

Abstract: The black box problem in machine learning has led to the introduction of an ever-increasing set of explanation methods for complex models. These explanations have different properties, which in turn has led to the problem of method selection: which explanation method is most suitable for a given use case? In this work, we propose a unifying framework of attribution-based explanation methods, which provides a step towards a rigorous study of the similarities and differences of explanations. We first introduce removal-based attribution methods (RBAMs), and show that an extensively broad selection of existing methods can be viewed as such RBAMs. We then introduce the canonical additive decomposition (CAD). This is a general construction for additively decomposing any function based on the central idea of removing (groups of) features. We proceed to show that indeed every valid additive decomposition is an instance of the CAD, and that any removal-based attribution method is associated with a specific CAD. Next, we show that any removal-based attribution method can be completely defined as a game-theoretic value or interaction index for a specific (possibly constant-shifted) cooperative game, which is defined using the corresponding CAD of the method. We then use this intrinsic connection to define formal descriptions of specific behaviours of explanation methods, which we also call functional axioms, and identify sufficient conditions on the corresponding CAD and game-theoretic value or interaction index of an attribution method under which the attribution method is guaranteed to adhere to these functional axioms. Finally, we show how this unifying framework can be used to develop new, efficient approximations for existing explanation methods.

Authors: Arne Gevaert, Yvan Saeys

Last Update: Dec 18, 2024

Language: English

Source URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.13623

Source PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.13623

Licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Changes: This summary was created with assistance from AI and may have inaccuracies. For accurate information, please refer to the original source documents linked here.

Thank you to arxiv for use of its open access interoperability.

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